Threat Advisory

Lunar Spider APT Uses FakeCaptcha Campaign to Deliver Latrodectus V2 Loader through Websites

Threat: Malicious Campaign
Threat Actor Name: Lunar Spider
Threat Actor Type:  Financially Motivated
Targeted Region: Global
Alias: Gold Swathmore
Threat Actor Region: Russia
Targeted Sector: Technology & IT, Finance & Banking
Criticality: High


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Lunar Spider has expanded a web-based infection chain that compromises vulnerable websites to deliver a multi-stage loader aimed at gaining persistent access to victim networks. The campaign uses an on-site FakeCaptcha overlay to trick visitors and harvest interaction data while ultimately delivering a Windows installer that stages a malicious loader known as Latrodectus V2.

The compromise begins with exploitation of improperly configured Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) on third-party sites, allowing the actor to insert a malicious JavaScript snippet. That script builds a registry object and verifies loader availability via HEAD requests with an image fallback; it then creates a fullscreen iframe that loads a FakeCaptcha page and can relay clipboard or copy actions back to the page. The FakeCaptcha invokes a PowerShell command to fetch an MSI. The MSI contains a legitimate Intel executable that is registered in a Run key and is used to sideload a malicious DLL via DLL search-order hijacking. Once executed, Latrodectus connects to a command-and-control server and runs enumeration and post-compromise actions according to its build configuration. The injected framework also captures user interaction and forwards those telemetry events to a Telegram channel used by the actor for monitoring.

This campaign blends web compromise, client-side social engineering, and a simple but effective SIDeloading persistence technique; defenders should therefore prioritize web-app hardening, monitor for unexpected script tags or iframe injections on public sites, and instrument endpoint telemetry to alert on new Run-key registrations, unusual MSI installations, and DLL sideloading behaviors. Block or monitor known malicious delivery domains and actor telemetry, deploy integrity checking for web content, and perform targeted hunts using the provided to rapidly detect and contain any related intrusions.

 

Tactic Technique Id Technique Sub-technique
Resource Development T1584.006 Compromise Infrastructure Web Services
Initial Access T1189 Drive-by Compromise
Execution T1204.004 User Execution Malicious Copy and Paste
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Defense Evasion T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls Code Signing
Discovery T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
T1518.001 Software Discovery Security Software Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
T1135 Network Share Discovery
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols
T1008 Fallback Channels
T1573.001 Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography

 

REFERENCES:

The following reports contain further technical details:

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