Threat Advisory

ScreenConnect Flaw Lets Attackers Execute Malicious Files on MSP Technician Workstations

Threat: Vulnerability
Targeted Region: Global
Targeted Sector: Technology & IT
Criticality: Critical
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A critical vulnerability in a remote access platform allows unauthorized guests to execute files on technician workstations without user confirmation. The flaw, rated with the highest possible severity score, affects both support and access sessions, enabling attackers to push malicious payloads directly to the host client. This risk is particularly acute for managed service providers, where a single compromised technician workstation grants access to numerous customer environments and stored credentials. The initial access vector relies on the victim joining a session, whether it is a legitimate customer support call or a rogue guest session planted by the attacker. The scope includes hundreds of managed endpoints across multiple organizations, with the threat distributed through repeated automated requests waiting for a technician to connect.

The exploitation chain begins when a guest pushes a batch file to the technician's temporary directory, which the host client executes automatically. The script relaunches itself in a hidden state using PowerShell and decodes a communication token to report the new victim to the operator via a messaging service. It then performs reconnaissance to identify the operating system build and check for existing installations. A download utility retrieves a stage-two installer from an attacker-controlled domain, which is unpacked using the system installer in administrative mode to avoid leaving standard installation records. The malware modifies a system service to ensure persistence and uses token manipulation to launch the payload under a different trust level. The final stage is a rebranded remote access client that masquerades as a legitimate update tool, connecting to an attacker-hosted relay on a non-standard port. This process completes in under ten seconds, establishing full remote control while hiding its presence from the user.[/subscribe_to_unlock_form]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A critical vulnerability in a remote access platform allows unauthorized guests to execute files on technician workstations without user confirmation. The flaw, rated with the highest possible severity score, affects both support and access sessions, enabling attackers to push malicious payloads directly to the host client. This risk is particularly acute for managed service providers, where a single compromised technician workstation grants access to numerous customer environments and stored credentials. The initial access vector relies on the victim joining a session, whether it is a legitimate customer support call or a rogue guest session planted by the attacker. The scope includes hundreds of managed endpoints across multiple organizations, with the threat distributed through repeated automated requests waiting for a technician to connect.

The exploitation chain begins when a guest pushes a batch file to the technician's temporary directory, which the host client executes automatically. The script relaunches itself in a hidden state using PowerShell and decodes a communication token to report the new victim to the operator via a messaging service. It then performs reconnaissance to identify the operating system build and check for existing installations. A download utility retrieves a stage-two installer from an attacker-controlled domain, which is unpacked using the system installer in administrative mode to avoid leaving standard installation records. The malware modifies a system service to ensure persistence and uses token manipulation to launch the payload under a different trust level. The final stage is a rebranded remote access client that masquerades as a legitimate update tool, connecting to an attacker-hosted relay on a non-standard port. This process completes in under ten seconds, establishing full remote control while hiding its presence from the user.[emaillocker id="1283"]

The campaign demonstrates a high level of operational persistence, with attackers spraying hundreds of thousands of file execution requests across dozens of servers over several weeks. Specific file names indicate distinct payload waves, while other sessions use harmless text files as canaries to test exploit viability before deploying malicious code. Some attackers also attempted path traversal to place scripts in the startup folder for persistent access across reboots. The motivation appears to be the acquisition of broad access to multiple customer networks through a single point of compromise. Defensively, organizations must update all technician clients to the latest patched version and remove file transfer permissions from guest roles. Additionally, monitoring for unusual file execution patterns from remote access clients and reviewing server logs for high-volume guest requests is essential to detect and mitigate this threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

  • We recommend you to update ScreenConnect host clients and Access agents to version 26.6.5.
  • We recommend you to remove the TransferFiles permission from ScreenConnect roles and session groups if you cannot update ScreenConnect to version 26.6.5.
  • We recommend you to restrict who can join ScreenConnect sessions as a guest and review guest-side permissions on Support sessions.

THREAT PROFILE:

Tactic Technique Id Technique Sub-technique
Initial Access T1199 Trusted Relationship -
Execution T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution -
Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter Windows Command Shell
Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell
Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process Windows Service
Privilege Escalation T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation Create Process with Token
Defense Evasion T1564.003 Hide Artifacts Hidden Window
Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information -
Defense Evasion T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution Msiexec
Defense Evasion T1027.004 Obfuscated Files or Information Compile After Delivery
Defense Evasion T1036.005 Masquerading Match Legitimate Name or Location

REFERENCES:

The following reports contain further technical details:

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