Threat Advisory

Yoba Malware Campaign Abuses ZIP Archives and Malicious AI Packages via GitHub

Threat: Malware Campaign
Targeted Region: Global
Targeted Sector: Technology & IT
Criticality: High
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A malware campaign tracked as Yoba exploits the growing popularity of artificial intelligence applications by distributing malicious installers through fraudulent GitHub repositories and GitHub Pages websites impersonating legitimate ChatGPT and Claude desktop applications. The campaign uses deceptive software downloads and trusted application branding to trick users into installing malware. By bundling malicious components with legitimate, digitally signed executables, the operators attempt to bypass security controls and evade detection.

The infection begins when users download and execute ZIP archives containing legitimate OpenAI or Anthropic setup executables alongside a malicious DLL named winmm.dll. The DLL, identified as YobaDropper, exploits DLL sideloading to execute malicious code within the trusted application's process. It performs multiple anti-analysis checks, including process-name verification, prolonged execution delays, keyboard-layout detection, and administrator privilege checks to evade automated analysis. Following successful execution, YobaDropper creates a directory under ProgramData, deploys an additional malicious DLL, and establishes persistence through a scheduled task running under the Local System account. The scheduled task launches a legitimate Windows Media Player executable that sideloads the second-stage component, YobaLoader. The loader retrieves additional instructions through a Telegram channel, generates dynamic domains using a domain generation algorithm (DGA), and queries Google's DNS-over-HTTPS service to obtain encrypted payload locations. It subsequently downloads payloads from public hosting services such as Catbox and supports multiple execution methods, including process injection into svchost.exe, standalone executable execution, and hidden PowerShell execution. The observed final payload is XMRig cryptocurrency mining malware, which uses a Tor proxy to communicate with mining infrastructure and can monitor system activity to reduce noticeable resource consumption.[/subscribe_to_unlock_form]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A malware campaign tracked as Yoba exploits the growing popularity of artificial intelligence applications by distributing malicious installers through fraudulent GitHub repositories and GitHub Pages websites impersonating legitimate ChatGPT and Claude desktop applications. The campaign uses deceptive software downloads and trusted application branding to trick users into installing malware. By bundling malicious components with legitimate, digitally signed executables, the operators attempt to bypass security controls and evade detection.

The infection begins when users download and execute ZIP archives containing legitimate OpenAI or Anthropic setup executables alongside a malicious DLL named winmm.dll. The DLL, identified as YobaDropper, exploits DLL sideloading to execute malicious code within the trusted application's process. It performs multiple anti-analysis checks, including process-name verification, prolonged execution delays, keyboard-layout detection, and administrator privilege checks to evade automated analysis. Following successful execution, YobaDropper creates a directory under ProgramData, deploys an additional malicious DLL, and establishes persistence through a scheduled task running under the Local System account. The scheduled task launches a legitimate Windows Media Player executable that sideloads the second-stage component, YobaLoader. The loader retrieves additional instructions through a Telegram channel, generates dynamic domains using a domain generation algorithm (DGA), and queries Google's DNS-over-HTTPS service to obtain encrypted payload locations. It subsequently downloads payloads from public hosting services such as Catbox and supports multiple execution methods, including process injection into svchost.exe, standalone executable execution, and hidden PowerShell execution. The observed final payload is XMRig cryptocurrency mining malware, which uses a Tor proxy to communicate with mining infrastructure and can monitor system activity to reduce noticeable resource consumption.[emaillocker id="1283"]

It demonstrates how malicious actors abuse legitimate software, digitally signed executables, and trusted online platforms to distribute malware while evading traditional security detection mechanisms. Although the observed activity primarily involves cryptocurrency mining, YobaLoader's ability to execute additional executable and PowerShell payloads creates opportunities for deploying other malicious tools in future operations. Organizations should restrict unauthorized software installations, verify application download sources, monitor suspicious DLL sideloading activities, investigate unexpected scheduled-task creation, and detect unusual process relationships. Security teams should also inspect complete software packages rather than relying solely on valid digital signatures to establish application trustworthiness.

THREAT PROFILE:

Tactic Technique Id Technique Sub-technique
Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing Spearphishing Attachment
Persistence T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow DLL Side-Loading
Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job Scheduled Task
Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys
Privilege Escalation T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Bypass User Account Control
Defense Evasion T1055.005 Process Injection Dynamic Link Library Injection
Defense Evasion T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information Software Packing
Defense Evasion T1070.004 Indicator Removal File Deletion
Command and Control T1571.002 Ingress Tool Transfer Ingress Proxy
Command and Control T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol DNS
Command and Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols
Impact T1499.004 Endpoint Denial of Service System Resources Consumption

MBC MAPPING:

Objective Behavior ID Behavior
Anti-Behavioral Analysis B0003 Dynamic Analysis Evasion
Anti-Behavioral Analysis B0009 Virtual Machine Detection
Command and Control B0031 Domain Name Generation
Command and Control B0030 C2 Communication
Command and Control E1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Defense Evasion E1055 Process Injection
Execution E1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Impact B0018 Resource Hijacking
Persistence F0012 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Cryptography Micro-objective C0029 Cryptographic Hash
Cryptography Micro-objective C0031 Decrypt Data
Memory Micro-objective C0007 Allocate Memory

REFERENCES:

The following reports contain further technical details:

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